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Abstract 
 This study which was exploratory in nature aimed to examine the 
extent to which firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange disclosure 
social responsibility information and also to determine company and 
corporate governance variables that influence the Corporate Social 
Disclosures (CSD) practice in Kenya. Data on the disclosure index and 
company characteristics were obtained from the annual reports of the 
respective companies. A relationship between the disclosure index and the 
various company characteristics was determined. It was found that size, 
profitability, liquidity, industry in which a company operates have a positive 
influence on the level of CSD. In addition, a company that a dispersed 
ownership disclosed more information than a company with concentrated 
ownership. Gearing and country of origin were found to have no influence 
on the level of CSD. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Disclosures, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Agency Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory 
 
Introduction 
 There is a growing global concern about the impact of businesses on 
society. This has mainly been brought about by the increasing concern of the 
influence businesses on the environment and the issue of climatic change. 
Society also expects more from the businesses than it did before. Businesses 
are now expected to be transparent and accountable, and that they should be 
involved in promoting societal wellbeing. This has led companies to have a 
need to inform society of what they are doing, which in turn has led to the 
development of Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) practice. 
 CSD refers to information that is provided by a company about its 
interactions with society (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). CSD also refers to 
voluntary reporting of social and environmental information of a company’s 
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interactions with different stakeholders (Lim, Talha, Mohamed, & 
Sallehhuddin, 2008). Companies may be involved in CSD so as to discharge 
a moral duty, gain competitive advantage, report the company’s 
performance, improve the company’s image (Buhr, 2007), and influence the 
external perceptions of the company (Deegan, 2002). Most of the studies 
indicate that CSD has been increasing over the years (Ratanajongkol, Davey, 
& Low, 2006). However, not all companies have embraced it (Gray & 
Bebbington, 2007) and its development has been somewhat slow and 
piecemeal (Ratanajongkol, Davey, & Low, 2006).  
 Due to the fact that the CSD practice is largely unregulated and 
therefore not standardized, it has not developed similarly in different regions 
of the world (Salama, Cathcart, Andrews, & Hall, 2006). Studies have shown 
that there are more social disclosures in the developed countries as compared 
to the developing countries and that the themes emphasized differ even in the 
developed countries. Majority of the researches on CSD have been done in 
the developed world. This study was therefore necessary in order to add to 
the growing literature on CSD in developing countries. 
 
Objective of the Study 
 The purpose of the study was to determine the relationship between 
corporate social disclosures and various company characteristics and 
corporate governance variables. 
 
Literature Review  
Corporate Social Disclosures 
 The traditional financial reporting has mainly concentrated on the 
needs of the industry, finance and the market (Makris, 1996). Social 
responsibility accounting has emanated from the need for accounting to 
address the needs of all the firms’ stakeholders. The growth of CSD has also 
been influenced by the fact that in the value creation process, firms are now 
relying more on intangibles and intellectual assets which are not properly 
captured in mandatory reporting (Braam & Borghans, 2010). Social 
responsibility accounting is, therefore, complimentary to traditional 
historical accounting and helps in disclosing more information to various 
stakeholders.  
 CSD has been defined variously in accounting literature. Most of the 
CSD definitions are premised on the fact that companies have other 
reponsibilities in addition to making monies for the providers of capital. One 
of the earliest definitions is offered by Elias and Epstein (1975, p. 36) who 
define it as the “reporting on some aspects of the business organization’s 
social activities, performance or impact”. Others have defined it as 
information provided by a company about its interactions with society 
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(Crawford & Williams, 2010). It has also been referred to as the reporting of 
social and environmental information of a company’s interactions with 
different stakeholders (Crawford & Williams, 2010). These definitions can 
best be summed up by the definition by (Gray, Owen, and Adams (1996, p. 
3) who define CSD as “the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of organisations’ economic actions to particular 
interest groups within society and to society at large”. 
 It should be noted that though much of the CSD is voluntary 
(Crawford & Williams, 2010), in recent years it is increasingly being 
embedded in the annual reports of corporations in order to address the needs 
of all stakeholders (Walker, Michael, & Urmila, 2007), as well as to create 
public awareness on the role of corporations in the society (Ratanajongkol, 
Davey, & Low, 2006). Stakeholders are demanding more transparency from 
the company in order to protect their interests in the corporation (Crawford 
& Williams, 2010). This has become more critical due to the recent corporate 
scandals which have made it evident that a company’s survival and 
competitiveness can be endangered by a single focus on shareholder wealth 
maximization (Drews, 2010). Managers also have become more aware of 
sustainability issues and want to make their contribution which can only be 
supported by the availability of reliable information (Burritt & Schaltegger, 
2010). 
 
CSD Theories 
 Several theories can be used to explain CSD practice. The main 
theories are the agency theory, legitimacy theory, and the stakeholder theory. 
 
Agency theory 
 The agency theory tries to explain the conflict that can arise between 
the management on the one hand and the owners on the other hand. The 
agency problem leads to information asymmetry where the management has 
more information about the company than the owners (Thakor, 1993). One 
way of dealing with the information asymmetry problem is good corporate 
governance practices (Melis, 2004). The other way is to disclose more 
information (Narayanan, Pinches, & Kelm, 2000).  
 
The legitimacy theory 
 Legitimacy has been described as the congruence between the 
society’s value system and those of the organization (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975). The legitimacy theory is based on the premise that a company has a 
right to exist, and that this right is deserved by acting in accordance with the 
expectations of the society with which it interacts (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975). The basic notion of legitimacy theory is the concept of social contract 
European Scientific Journal April 2017 edition Vol.13, No.11  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
115 
which may be expressed or implied (Elmogla, 2009). According to this 
theory, firms do not have an inherent right to exist; they do so with society’s 
permission (Ratanajongkol, Davey, & Low, 2006). A firm is seen as a part of 
wider society in which it exists; which means, therefore, that the legitimacy 
theory is essentially a systems oriented theory. 
 According to Guthrie and Parker (1989), if the legitimacy theory 
holds true, then corporations will react by disclosing more information when 
there are major social and environmental events. This has been confirmed by 
a study by Deagan et al. (2002). According to O’Donovan (2002), 
organizations need to continually maintain their legitimacy because society’s 
expectations change from time to time. The author also notes that different 
organisations have different levels of legitimacy to maintain. Legitimation 
strategies can be used to change the perceptions of the society about a 
company without changing the real activities of the organisation (Milne & 
Patten, 2002). 
 
The stakeholder theory 
 In the stakeholder theory, the organization is seen as part of a wider 
social system (Ratanajongkol, Davey, & Low, 2006). The main argument of 
the stakeholder theory is that there are wider groups of stakeholders in a 
company other than shareholders and other investors (Sternberg, 1997). The 
theory also holds that the success of an organization is dependent on how it 
manages its relationships with various stakeholders (Elijido-Ten, 2009). The 
organization, therefore, needs to manage the various stakeholders who are 
affected by the organization or affect the decisions it makes (Freedman, 
1983). It has been shown that the key drivers of CSR are stakeholder-related 
(Ernst & Young, 2002). 
 CSD is used to inform on the firm’s social performance to its internal 
and external stakeholders (Kaptein, 2007), serves as an input for dialogue 
between different stakeholders (Kaptein & Van Tulder, 2003) and, therefore, 
is a means by which stakeholder relations are managed (Zadek, 2001). 
 
Nairobi Securities Exchange 
 The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is the largest capital market 
in the East and Central Africa. It is also considered the third largest securities 
market in Africa. In 2016 there were over 50 companies listed on the 
exchange. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
Gearing 
 Empirical evidences on whether the level of financial leverage affects 
disclosure of information are contradictory. Some studies have found a 
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positive association between CSD and gearing (Bradbury, 1992; Naser, 
1998); others have not found any significant relationship between CSD and 
gearing (McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993; Carson & Simnett, 1997). For 
example, according to Ahmed and Nicholas (1994), companies in countries 
where financial institutions are the primary source of funds are likely to 
disclose more information if they have a higher level of gearing. Barako 
(2007) found that, in order to satisfy creditors and remove the suspicions of 
wealth transfer to shareholders, firms with higher level of gearing tend to 
disclose more information. Given the forgoing the following hypothesis was 
tested. 
H0: There is no positive association between the level of CSD and the 
gearing level of the company 
 
Size of the company 
 Many studies have shown that the company size is an important 
determinant of CSD (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Wallace & Naser, 1995).  
According to Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) agency costs increase with firm 
size and therefore the need to provide more information. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) and Cowen, at al. (1987) have said that larger firms have 
higher political costs due to their visibility. Such firms are therefore likely to 
disclose more information to improve their corporate image (Firth, 1979a). 
Ahmend and Courtis (1999) found size to be the most important determinant 
of CSD. 
H0: There is no positive association between the level of CSD and the size 
of the company 
 
Profitability 
 High profitable firms are likely to disclose more information in order 
to distinguish themselves from less profitable firms (Akerlof, 1970).  Several 
studies have shown that profitability and extent of disclosure are 
significantly associated (Wallace & Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). 
However, there are other studies that have not found any relationship 
between profitability and disclosures (Wallace, Nase, & Mora, 1994). 
H0: There is no positive association between the level of CSD and the 
profitability of the company 
 
Liquidity 
 High liquidity companies are likely to disclose more social 
responsibility information because they want to publish their strong status 
(Abd-El Salam & Weetman, 2003). There are, however, researchers who 
have opposite opinion arguing that low liquidity companies may disclose 
more information in order to satisfy the information requirements of 
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stakeholders (Hussainery, Elsayed, & Razik, 2011). Studies on whether the 
level of liquidity influences disclosure levels have been inconclusive. Cooke 
(1989) found a positive relationship, Belkaoui-Riahi and Kahl (1978) found 
no relationship, but Wallace et al. (1994) found a negative relationship 
between liquidity and the level of disclosures. 
H0: There is no positive association between the level of CSD and the 
liquidity of the company 
 
Industry 
 Companies in different industry types face different social pressures 
(Ness & Mirza, 1991; Gao, 2009). Companies with a higher likelihood of 
impacting on the environment have a higher social pressure to disclose 
environmental information (Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998; Uwalomwa, 
2011). Companies with widely consumed products are also likely to disclose 
more social information (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). Studies by Patten 
(Patten, 1991), Roberts (1992) and Hackston and Milne (1996) have found a 
positive association between CSD and the type of industry in which the 
company operates. 
H0: Level of CSD is not related to the industry to which the company 
belongs. 
 
Country of origin 
 Literature shows that the country in which a company is operating in, 
affects the level of CSD by that company (Silberhorn & Warren, 2007; 
Pratten & Mashat, 2009).  For example, Hame and Huse (1997), found that 
the country in which a company is operating, is an important factor 
influencing disclosure of corporate environmental information. Related to 
this is the country of origin. Studies have shown that subsidiaries of 
multinationals disclose more social information than their local counterparts. 
H0: Level of CSD is not higher for multinational companies. 
 
Ownership structure 
 Companies with a dispersed ownership are likely to disclose more 
information because of the agency conflicts that are likely to emerge 
(Depoers, 2000).  Where ownership is concentrated the investors are able to 
get information privately and therefore do not need a lot of disclosure 
(Archambault & Archambault, 2003). Studies by Roberts (1992) and 
Ullmann (Ullmann, 1985) have found that the degree to which ownership is 
concentrated on the hands of many investors influence positively the level of 
CSD. 
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H0: Level of CSD is not higher for companies with a more dispersed 
ownership structure 
 
Presence of non-executive directors 
 The presence of non-executive directors helps increase the 
effectiveness of the board because they provide necessary checks and 
balances (Franks, Mayer, & Renneboog, 2001) and this reduces conflict 
between different stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Various studies have 
shown that there is a positive relationship between the level of social 
disclosures and presence of non-executive directors (Chen & Jaggi, 2000).  
H0: Level of CSD is not higher for companies with a higher proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board  
 
Presence of dual leadership structure 
 One of the issues of corporate governance is the leadership structure 
(whether the chair of the board is also the CEO). Where the two roles are 
combined the board is significantly impaired and, therefore, cannot function 
properly (Barako, 2007). The CEO can act in his/her best interest because the 
board cannot effectively supervise him/her. Some studies have shown that 
there is a negative relationship between the combined role and the extent of 
CSD (Forker, 1992). 
H0: Level of CSD is not higher for companies with dual leadership 
structure 
 
Type of Auditor 
 According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986) due to the risk that 
auditors face where not enough information is disclosed, they are likely to 
influence their client to disclose as much information as possible. Larger 
audit firms are likely to influence more disclosure than small audit firms 
because of risk to their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981). Several studies indicate 
that indeed this is the case by showing a positive relationship between the 
size of the audit firm and corporate disclosure. 
H0: Level of CSD is not higher for companies audited by the big four 
audit firms 
 
Presence of Audit Committee 
 According to McMullen (1996), an audit committee increases 
reliability of financial reporting. They are commonly viewed as monitoring 
mechanisms that improve the quality of information flow (Bradbury, 1990). 
Ho and Wong (2001b) have shown that there is a positive relationship 
between corporate disclosures and the presence of audit committees.  
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H0: Level of CSD is not higher for companies with an audit committee of 
the board 
 
Research Methodology 
Disclosure Index 
 Proxies such as disclosure indices (Botosan, 1997; Garcia-Meca & 
Martinez, 2005) and content analysis (Williams, 1998) have been used to 
measure the extent of disclosures. In this study disclosure index was used to 
measure the CSD level. 
 In order to determine the disclosure index, an item got one point if it 
was disclosed (Bukh, Gormses, & Mouritsen, 2001) but got a score of zero if 
it was not disclosed at all (Firth, 1979b). The disclosure index of a company 
was calculated as its score divided by the maximum score achievable 
(Tarmizi, 2007). This score was determined in a pilot study. The disclosure 
index was calculated using the following formula. 
𝐷𝐼𝑗 = ∑𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑛𝑗  × 100 
 Where, DIj is the disclosure index for jth firm, di is 1 if the item is 
disclosed and 0 is the item is not disclosed, nj is the maximum number of 
items that can be disclosed by jth firm. The items included in the disclosure 
index calculation were also determined in the pilot study. The disclosure 
index was un-weighted due to the fact that it is difficult to assign weights to 
different items.  
 In the calculation of the disclosure indices of different companies 
annual reports were used. The rationale for using annual reports is that 
though they are not the only source of disclosures they are the most 
important (Ho & Wong, 2001a) and are likely to be linked to other 
disclosures (Lang & Lundholm, 1993). 
 
Reliability, validity and transferability 
 To test for and improve on reliability, the disclosure index calculated 
was compared to the disclosure index calculated by an independent 
evaluator. And to assure the validity, senior accountants from the companies, 
were asked to check the accuracy of the computed disclosure index and they 
all agreed that it properly reflected what was disclosed. 
 
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables were 
calculated in order to help explain the behaviour of the disclosures. Such 
descriptive statistics included the mean, maximum, minimum, standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis.  
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Regression analysis 
 The regression equation used panel data consisting of both cross-
sectional and time series observations for the period 2006 to 2011. Panel 
data, because of providing a large number of data points, reduces the 
collinearity among the independent variables and may also improve the 
efficiency of statistical estimates (Hsioa, 2003). However, it increases the 
degree of freedom. Panel data can help in detecting and measuring effects 
that cannot easily be observed in pure time-series or cross-sectional data and 
because of this it can be used to analyse dynamic changes (Gujarati, 2003). 
Table 1: Descriptions of the Regression Model Variables 
Variables Descriptions 
DI Disclosure index 
GER Gearing ratio  
SIZ Size  
PRO Profitability   
LIQ Liquidity of the company 
IND Industry to which the company belongs 
COU Country in which the country belongs 
OWN Ownership structure 
NED Presence of non-executive directors 
DEL Leadership structure 
AUD Auditor type 
AUC Presence of the audit committee of the board of directors 
ɛ Error term (residual value) 
 
 The model below was therefore tested. 
𝐷𝐼 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1GER + 𝛽2SIZ + 𝛽3PRO + 𝛽4LIQ + 𝛽5IND + 𝛽6COU+ 𝛽7OWN + 𝛽8NED + 𝛽9 DEL + 𝛽10AUD + 𝛽11AUC +  𝜀 
 
Findings and Analysis  
Multivariate analysis 
 In a panel data analysis, one has to choose whether to use the fixed-
effects model or the random effects model. Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is 
used to test whether the coefficients estimated by the fixed-effect model and 
the random effect model are the same. Significant P value shows that 
coefficients are different and therefore the fixed effect model should be used. 
 In this case the Chi2(5) had a value of 30.11 and a Prob>Chi2 =0.001. 
This means that the Chi2 was significant and therefore the fixed-effects 
model was the best model to use in the regression analysis. However, after 
running the fixed-effects regression some of the dummy variables that do not 
change over time get omitted from the model. A time-invariant variable is 
omitted from the fixed-effects model because such models are designed to 
study the causes of changes within the entity being studied (Kohler & 
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Kreuter, 2009).  The regression analysis was therefore conducted using the 
random effect model and the results obtained are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Regression Results 
Variables Coefficient Newey-West Standard Errors T-test P>|𝒕| 
Constant 0.18 1.19 0.15 0.882 
GER -0.11 0.10 -1.08 0.279 
SIZ 0.80 0.06 12.95 0.001 
PRO 0.19 0.06 2.99 0.003 
LIQ 0.29 0.12 2.54 0.012 
OWN 0.42 0.19 2.23 0.026 
NED 0.27 0.23 1.17 0.241 
IN1 -0.16 0.09 -1.70 0.091 
IN2 -0.32 0.09 -3.59 0.001 
IN3 -0.21 0.11 -1.95 0.051 
IN4 -0.43 0.10 -4.14 0.001 
IN5 -0.41 0.15 -2.75 0.006 
IN6 -0.47 0.09 -5.06 0.001 
IN7 -0.19 0.11 -1.71 0.088 
IN8 -0.09 0.13 -0.76 0.450 
IN9 -0.02 0.11 -0.17 0.861 
COU -0.06 0.05 -1.06 0.292 
 
 The results presented in Table 2 indicate that size, profitability, 
liquidity, ownership, and the industry in which a company operates are 
significant at 5% level of significance. Gearing of the company, presence of 
non-executive directors and whether a company is a multinational company 
or not, are not significant at 5% level of significance.  The data obtained for 
leadership structure, auditor type and the presence of an audit committee 
were the same for all studied companies and were, therefore, not used in the 
regression model.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
Size 
 The finding in this study is that the size of the company influences 
positively the level of CSD.  This finding is consistent with previous findings 
by Cowen et al. (1987), Patten (1991), Raar (2002) and, Stanwick and 
Stanwick (2006). Other researchers such as Roberts (1992), and 
Ratanajongkol et al.  (2006), however, did not find a relationship between 
the size of the company and the level of CSD. 
 This finding agrees with the stakeholder theory which suggests that 
because of the many stakeholders they have, larger companies are likely to 
disclose more information (Cowen, Ferreri, & Parker, 1987). It also agrees 
with the legitimacy theory because larger firms are likely to disclose more 
information to legitimize their actions (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). 
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Profitability 
 Profitability was found to have a positive influence on the level of 
CSD.  This finding agrees with findings from similar studies (Singhvi, 1967; 
Abu-Nasar & Rutherford, 1994).  The findings contradict findings by several 
researchers who have found a negative relationship between profitability and 
CSD (King & Lenox, 2001). King and Lenox found that CSD reduces 
profitability because of the costs it entails. It also contradicts findings by 
Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004), and Stanwick and Stanwick (Stanwick 
& Stanwick, 2006), who found no correlation between financial performance 
and CSD. 
 The positive association between profitability and CSD can be 
explained by legitimacy theory. Very profitable companies may disclose 
more information in order to justify the level of their reported profits 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). This positive association can also be explained 
using the agency theory. According to the agency theory, in order to justify 
their higher pay, managers in high profitable companies are likely to disclose 
more information (Inchausti, 1997; Giner, 1997).  
 
Liquidity 
 Findings in this study indicate that liquidity has a positive influence 
on the level of CSD of a company. This finding agrees with Cooke (1989) 
who says that there is an association between high liquidity and greater 
levels of disclosures. It, however, disagrees with Wallace et al. (1994) 
findings that there is a negative association between disclosures and liquidity 
level of a company and Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) findings that there is no 
association between liquidity and the level of disclosures.  
 Higher liquidity companies are likely to disclose more social 
information than lower liquidity companies because they have stronger 
incentives to do so. They are motivated by the need to publish their strong 
status in order to enhance their reputation (Abd-El Salam & Weetman, 
2003). On the other hand, some argue that, in order to satisfy the information 
requirements of stakeholders, managers of low liquid companies may publish 
more information in their annual reports (Hussainery, Elsayed, & Razik, 
2011). 
 
Industry 
 The study found a positive association between the industry profile of 
a company and the CSD level. This finding is consistent with Patten (1991), 
Roberts (1992) and Hackston and Milne (1996) who found a positive 
association between CSD and the type of industry in which the company 
operates. 
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 The fact that the industry in which a company operates in influences 
the level of CSD can be explained by the stakeholder pressure and associated 
political costs (Brammer & Millington, 2006). Companies that have a high 
environmental impact receive more attention from the government and other 
lobby groups and therefore likely to disclose more social information 
(Deegan & Gordon, 1996). 
 
Ownership 
 The regression results indicate that the more dispersed the ownership 
of the company, the more likely that the company will disclose more social 
responsibility information. This finding agrees with Roberts (1992) and 
Ullmann (1985) that the degree to which ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of many investors influences CSD. In order to reduce information 
asymmetries among the owners and management, corporations with more 
dispersed ownership are likely expected to disclose more social information 
(Prencipe, 2004). This can be explained by the fact that where there are 
many shareholders, there is likely to be a higher level of accountability 
which leads to disclosure of more social information (Ghazali, 2007). This is 
because there is likely to be more conflict of interest between owners and 
managers where ownership is widely dispersed and this leads to increased 
pressure for more disclosures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Cullen & 
Christopher, 2002). This finding supports the agency theory in explaining 
why companies disclose social responsibility information. 
 
Gearing 
 Gearing was found not affect the level of CSD. Findings by different 
researchers are varied. That gearing level does not affect CSD is supported 
by Purushothaman et al. (2000), who argue that, because of their close 
relationships with their creditors, companies with high gearing level are 
unlikely to disclose a lot of social information. This is because they can use 
other means of disclosures.  
 This finding, however, does not agree with Schipper (1981) who 
argues that high geared firms are likely to provide more information than 
other companies because their creditors want to know about the company. 
Therefore, management increases the level of non-financial disclosures 
because of the demand by such stakeholders (Joshi & Gao, 2009). 
Companies with a high gearing are also likely to disclose more information 
in order to reduce their agency cost and their cost of capital (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
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Country of origin 
 Country of origin was found not to affect the level of CSD in Kenya. 
This contradicts studies by researchers such as Jahamani (2003), and, 
Stanwick and Stanwick (2006), who found an association between the level 
of social disclosures and the country of origin of the company. 
 The finding that country of origin does not affect CSD can be 
explained the fact that Kenya is one of the country in Africa with many 
multinationals operating and others have their regional offices. This means 
that international business practices have been adopted by the local 
companies as they try to mimic the practices of the multinationals. This 
supports the institutional theory. 
 And so, one would expect greatest disclosures in large companies, 
that are highly profitable, more liquid, with more diverse ownership and 
from highly visible industries. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 Though an attempt has been made to use a longitudinal study, the 
time covered is short: only 6 years. A study that covers a longer period can 
help reveal more information of the CSD practise in Kenya. This study, 
however, covers a longer period than most CSD studies that are cross-
sectional. 
 The sample consisted of only the 54 companies listed on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE). Because these are the top companies in Kenya, 
they are the most likely to make social responsibility disclosures. The study, 
therefore, is limited in the sense that it did not include companies that are 
small and are not closely monitored by the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA). 
 In this study, only annual reports were used. According to Unerman 
(2000) annual reports may not capture all the information disclosed by a 
company because companies may have used other media, such as websites 
and stand-alone reports. Use of annual reports, however, is consistent with 
many CSD studies due to the fact that they are the most important 
documents. 
 Content analysis was used for this study. Use of content analysis can 
be criticized for being subjective because people can interpret the same 
information differently. To minimize errors an independent evaluator was 
used analyse the information and the result compared with the findings of the 
main researcher. The independent evaluator was an accountant with one of 
the main auditing firm with good understanding of CSD. This was meant to 
make the data obtained more reliable.  
 Only listed companies were used in this study. Listed companies 
because of their visibility are likely to disclose more social information as 
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compared to unlisted companies. It is, however, important to note that 
information on listed companies is easier to obtain.  
 
Further Research 
 Investigation should be done on corporate social responsibility 
information disclosures in reports other than the annual reports. This is 
because as CSD develops, more and more reports apart from the annual 
reports will disclose more social responsibility information. This research 
only covered companies listed on the stock market. Further research should 
be conducted into companies that are not listed on the stock market so as to 
compare the findings of the listed companies and those of others. 
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